My latest paper for King's College London ("On the Viability of Limited Nuclear Weapons as Strategy") is complete:
"Limited nuclear warfare -- small-scale nuclear attacks that do not develop into a larger nuclear conflict -- has been a strategic concept with varying levels of military and political support for many decades. The underlying principle of limited nuclear warfare has always been in a pre-emptive or preclusive strike capacity, with the intention of either preventing or avoiding a larger nuclear conflict. In another interpretation of the concept, however, a strategy of limited nuclear warfare could be employed against non-nuclear powers as a method of definitively striking an enemy, without causing large-scale nuclear damage, to prevent a larger traditional conflict.
There remains some debate -- academically, socially, and within governments -- about whether limited nuclear strikes can and should be used. More specifically, there seems to be something of an open question as to whether a limited nuclear strike would be tolerated. Would a nuclear state elect to not respond, in-kind, with a nuclear attack? Would a non-nuclear state look to its nuclear allies for a response-in-kind? The long-dominant strategic theory of Mutually Assured Destruction and the underlying principles of human psychology have, thus far, precluded the combat use of nuclear weapons in any context other than their original debut at the end of World War II. However, given the rise of increasing technological and sociopolitical complexities in a worldwide environment that continues to see the development and limited success of non-state actors, the question of limited nuclear strikes as a viable strategic option has newfound relevancy and depth."
Kyle R. Brady